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ABSTRACT 
Despite the volumes of material written on the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, 
little work has examined what intelligence is required to provide national policymakers 
with the information they need to make good decisions governing counterinsurgency. 
This thesis first reviews the problems experienced in Afghanistan with the collection and 
dissemination of intelligence from ground units to the national policymakers. It then 
takes a look at intelligence process doctrine encapsulated in service manuals of the U.S. 
Army and U.S. Marine Corps, as well as joint service intelligence doctrine, and 
determines that priority intelligence requirements are not being properly articulated to 
obtain the answers policymakers require. 
After a review of counterinsurgency doctrine and theories, this thesis proposes 
three priority intelligence requirements for use in counterinsurgency operations. These 
three intelligence requirements focus on: 1) supporting operations that attack the 
insurgency’s support infrastructure; 2) identify host-nation government personnel or 
institutions that are not effectively supporting counterinsurgency policy; and 3) revealing 
how the insurgency is undermining popular support for the government. This thesis 
identifies a way to get the answers to those priority intelligence requirements from the 
ground units to the policymakers in a usable form. 
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I. THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM IN COIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Joint Publication 2–0 states, “Information is of greatest value when it contributes 
to or shapes the commander’s decision-making process by providing reasoned insight 
into future conditions or situations” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication [JP] 2–
0: Joint Intelligence I-1). This information becomes intelligence when it is combined 
with historical context and other information on the operational environment (U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence I-1). Intelligence is only deemed useful when it 
meets clearly articulated intelligence requirements sent to the intelligence community by 
consumers. Intelligence agencies should produce intelligence products based on these 
requirements (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence I-2). At least, that is 
how it is supposed to work. 
According to MG Flynn and a subsequent study conducted by the Defense 
Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence, policymakers are suffering from a 
lack of intelligence when making decisions that have to do with the conduct of 
counterinsurgency operations (Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor; Dept. of Defense, 
Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence). The reason they are lacking 
proper intelligence to support their decision-making is because they are not abiding by 
the traditional intelligence cycle. They are not identifying and prioritizing their 
intelligence collection requirements to support the policy decisions they will have to 
make (Dept. of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence 29–
30). This lack of identified intelligence requirements is exacerbated by the near-complete 
reliance on the military to collect the intelligence needed for these decisions (Dept. of 
Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence 61). This leads to an 
almost exclusive focus of military intelligence assets for identifying enemy personnel for 
a military unit to kill or capture because the military has focused on counterterrorist 
operations and force protection (Dept. of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Defense Intelligence 63).   
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If policymakers or senior intelligence officials were to use the intelligence cycle 
and produce an effective prioritized list of intelligence requirements for 
counterinsurgency operations, a portion of the problem would be addressed. When the 
policymakers give proper counterinsurgency intelligence collection priorities, and 
intelligence officials and military leaders are held to the requirements, policymakers will 
begin to get what they need. That leaves the question of how to get the information from 
the military units to the policymakers. 
To achieve this goal of moving the crucial intelligence from the ground units to 
the policymakers requires the refinement of current doctrine on the production of 
intelligence assessments. Written assessments that start with policy recommendations 
will help to accomplish this task. If an intelligence section uses written assessments that 
start with a policy recommendation, it will tend to influence the intelligence sections and 
units to support their recommendations with facts. These facts can be retrieved through 
the intelligence process. In short, the solution is the development of priority intelligence 
requirements to support decision-making at the policymaker level and written 
assessments that help to move that intelligence up the chain and provide more 
information than bullets on a PowerPoint slide. 
In this chapter, the problem of a lack of prioritized intelligence requirements will 
be examined. Additionally, the process of how intelligence requirements are supposed to 
be developed and prioritized in joint, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Army doctrine will be 
described. This doctrine will show how the intelligence process focuses on the 
identification and reassessment of priority intelligence requirements to support decision-
making and intelligence production. This process is nearly identical in the three doctrines. 
In the chapters that follow, different approaches to counterinsurgency campaigns 
will be examined to determine those intelligence requirements that would be needed to 
successfully execute a counterinsurgency campaign using joint, Army, and Marine Corps 
doctrine. Once those intelligence requirements are identified, an assessment format will 
be recommended to move the collected intelligence from the military units that collected 
it to the policymakers. 
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This by no means assumes that civilian intelligence personnel and agencies are 
not collecting the information that policymakers require for effective decision making in 
counterinsurgency situations. This thesis focuses on the contribution of military 
intelligence to counterinsurgency intelligence collection and production. The goal of this 
thesis is to identify the answers to two questions. First, what do policymakers need to 
know to manage counterinsurgency operations?  Second, how should military units 
communicate the answers to the questions? An understanding of the intelligence cycle is 
required to begin to answer these two questions. 
B. THE PROBLEM 
The traditional intelligence cycle consists of seven steps (Betts 15): 
1. Policymakers identify what they need to know and intelligence 
professionals develop the requirements. 
2. People or organizations are assigned the task to collect the data to fill the 
requirement. 
3. The needed information is collected and reported. 
4. The collected information is analyzed. 
5. The analyzed intelligence is then placed into a finished product for 
consumption. 
6. The finished product is disseminated to those who need it and throughout 
the intelligence community. 
7. The final step is a policymaker makes a decision or another requirement is 
levied. 
The steps of this cycle apply to all intelligence activities and operations, to 
include counterinsurgency operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Marine Corps, 
and the U.S. Army all have similar intelligence cycles in their doctrinal manuals. Some 
have fewer components, but all the ones listed above are included as components or 
subcomponents of their respective intelligence cycles. Despite the uniformity of the 
intelligence cycle, the existence of this doctrine does not necessarily mean it is being 
followed. 
In January 2010, Major General Michael Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, and Paul 
Batchelor wrote an article while deployed to Afghanistan that shows this doctrine is not 
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being applied. Their article states that General Stanley McChrystal and President Obama 
were not getting the information they needed to make effective decisions regarding 
management of the war in Afghanistan. MG Flynn had been serving as the CJ2 for the 
International Security Assistance Force for six months when the article was published 
(Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 3). He was the senior U.S. intelligence officer in 
Afghanistan at the time (Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 4). 
Flynn et al. wrote: 
Having focused the overwhelming majority of its collection efforts and 
analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the vast intelligence apparatus 
is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which 
U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. 
Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the 
powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the 
correlations between various development projects and the levels of 
cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best 
position to find answers—whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers—U.S. 
intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high 
level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information 
they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency. (Flynn, Pottinger, and 
Batchelor 7) 
This quote is revealing because in 2009 the United States drafted the U.S. 
Government Counterinsurgency Guide largely prepared by the Department of Defense, 
the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development. In 
this guide, the authors identified five components of a successful counterinsurgency 
(COIN) campaign  (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 3):  
1. Politics:  the reconciliation of the belligerents and the reform of the 
government (Kilcullen, Porter and Burgos 3). It is the most important 
because the success or failure of the campaign relies on the government’s 
ability to reform (Kilcullen, Porter and Burgos 2). 
2. Economic:  The government and its supporters must be able to improve 
the economic conditions of the populace (Kilcullen, Porter and Burgos 3). 
3. Security:  Security needs to progress while the first two components are 
being improved (Kilcullen, Porter and Burgos 3). It cannot exist on its 
own when the economy is poor and the political situation is not conducive. 
4. Information:  Information refers to intelligence, understanding, and 
influence (Kilcullen, Porter and Burgos 3). 
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5. The last component is establishing governmental control (Kilcullen, Porter 
and Burgos 3). Government control is largely a byproduct of the effective 
use of the first four components (Kilcullen, Porter and Burgos 18). 
These components, which are listed in order of priority, show one of the key 
points of the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. Military solutions to an 
insurgency rarely work alone. Counterinsurgency requires the cooperative efforts of 
civilian and military operations to be successful. The guide asserts that non-military 
means are usually more effective than military means (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 2). 
“The lesson to be learnt [sic] is that even if an armed insurgency is defeated, the political 
and subversive struggle will go on and can still win...” (Thompson 47). This statement 
alludes to the fact that the military means must be aligned with the political. According to 
the guide, the military cannot successfully prosecute a counterinsurgency campaign on its 
own (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 2). Operations focused on attacking insurgents cannot 
defeat an insurgency; they can only delay it from winning if there are no political 
improvements. Therefore, the intelligence collection in a counterinsurgency cannot be 
devoted wholesale to the identification of human targets to kill or capture. It must also 
focus on identifying other attributes that are imperative to conducting a successful 
counterinsurgency campaign. This devotion of assets to identifying enemy to kill or 
capture is indicative of a lack of proper priority intelligence requirements. Policymakers 
need information on the population and its effect on the insurgency. For example, the 
U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide states that counterinsurgency policy must 
address popular grievances and the host nation government’s ability or willingness to 
address these grievances (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 19). For policymakers to be able 
to address grievances of a foreign population, they must know what grievances exist. 
They likewise must know what institutions or persons within the supported government 
are unable or unwilling to implement reform so that a plan to address this issue can be 
implemented. 
The problem of a lack of proper intelligence requirements is at every echelon 
from the battalion level S2 (Intelligence Section) to the joint staff level J2 (Intelligence 
Section). The battalion level intelligence sections lack manpower to digest the mountains 
of information they receive from patrol debriefs, censuses, and the normal intelligence 
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reports generated by human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors and signals intelligence 
(SIGINT). Add on top of that the analysis that is required of the significant enemy 
activity in a maneuver unit’s area of operations and there is an enormous amount of work 
for an undermanned intelligence section (Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 7). This large 
amount of work and limited resources forces intelligence sections to have to prioritize 
work. If commanders do not clearly identify priorities, then intelligence professionals, 
due to their limited resources and time, will do so on their own. With the significant 
amount of casualties caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the most probable 
focus of an undermanned intelligence section will be on catching the people utilizing 
these weapons (Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 7). Only proper oversight from 
commanders can help to address this issue. 
“Intelligence oversight and the production and integration of intelligence in 
military operations are inherent responsibilities of command”  (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
JP 2–0 I-1). Commanders at every level are relied upon to set priorities when the 
intelligence section is undermanned to meet the requirements of the mission. Without that 
guidance, intelligence sections are left to determine what is important through trial and 
error or through the judgment of the individual S2. This is exactly what was happening in 
Afghanistan (Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 7–8). Commanders were not providing 
enough guidance on what information was important to be analyzed, so the information 
and intelligence needed by higher echelons was not being analyzed and written into 
assessments (Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 7). 
This complex problem is exacerbated at the brigade level and higher. Brigade 
Commanders are appalled by the number of casualties suffered in IED attacks and spend 
a large portion of their intelligence manpower on trying to identify the people or 
organizations emplacing these weapons (Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 7). This effect 
spills over into collection management where our technical means of collection are used 
around the clock to identify and locate these terrorist cells (Flynn, Pottinger, and 
Batchelor 8). The overemphasis on enemy-focused collection efforts was identified as a 
problem in a paper released by RAND. The paper states that the military tends to focus 
on enemy centric intelligence because it leads to action. This in turn means that the 
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outcomes of the intelligence production are tangible and easily measured. Intelligence 
collected on the population, not involving a raid to kill or capture an enemy combatant, 
does not. The intelligence section gets immediate feedback on intelligence focused on the 
enemy and may not in other forms of intelligence (Connable 12). Intelligence leaders 
misinterpret this feedback as prioritizing enemy focused intelligence. This immediate 
feedback may also lead commanders to incorrectly prioritize enemy centric intelligence.   
In either case this leads to a lack of knowledge and collection on other factors fueling the 
insurgency. 
In one instance, the White House requested a theater-level assessment on a 
specific subject involving the insurgency in Afghanistan, but the multitude of theater 
level analysts did not have enough information to craft an assessment based on reporting 
(Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 9). General McChrystal was even more precise when he 
stated, “Our senior leaders—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of 
Defense, Congress, the President of the United States—are not getting the right 
information to make decisions with…The media is driving the issues. We need to build a 
process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers” (Flynn, Pottinger 
and Batchelor 9). This demonstrates why even politicians will look to the news for 
information before they will consult military intelligence sources (Flynn, Pottinger and 
Batchelor 9). 
After the Flynn article was published, the Defense Science Board Task Force was 
given the task of researching the problems being faced with regards to intelligence 
collection for counterinsurgency operations. The Defense Science Board found that a 
comprehensive set of intelligence requirements for counterinsurgency operations does not 
exist (Dept. of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence 62). 
Not only do comprehensive intelligence requirements for counterinsurgency not exist, 
neither do intelligence requirements to support a whole-of-government solution as 
dictated by the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Dept. of Defense, Defense 
Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence 40). Identifying requirements is the 
first step in the intelligence process. If that first step is not fulfilled, then the 
policymakers cannot make effective decisions. Policymakers do not receive vital 
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information because that information is either not collected or not reported because it is 
not deemed to be important and does not address a requirement.   
The Defense Science Board Task Force also determined that there is confusion 
amongst Department of Defense leadership on counterinsurgency. Some defense leaders 
cannot differentiate between counterinsurgency, counterterrorist operations, and foreign 
internal defense (Dept. of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense 
Intelligence 22). This confusion further exacerbates the problem of a lack of intelligence 
requirements for counterinsurgency operations. This confusion means that people in 
positions of authority over the intelligence system may prioritize collection efforts 
thinking that they are addressing the insurgency when they are not. It will also lead to an 
increase in the application of intelligence collection assets against counterterrorist targets 
because of the immediate feedback that type of operations provides. 
The lack of requirements and predilection to focus on enemy centric intelligence 
also spills over into the collection effort of Department of Defense organizations. The 
Board found evidence that intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets are 
primarily being employed in support of counterterrorist operations and force protection in 
Afghanistan. They also found that ISR employment in theater is wholly ineffectively 
employed against intelligence requirements dealing with the population (Dept. of 
Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence 29–30). Both of 
these problems are indicative of a lack of proper priority intelligence requirements and 
confusion about counterinsurgency operations. 
The report published by the Defense Science Board Task Force stated that the 
absence of Department of State assets to fill intelligence requirements has shifted those 
requirements onto the Department of Defense (Dept. of Defense, Defense Science Board 
Task Force on Defense Intelligence 14). The problem with these requirements being 
levied on the military is that they do not get fulfilled. Commanders in Afghanistan were 
not requesting population centric intelligence from their S2s (Dept. of Defense, Defense 
Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence 30). Commanders are primarily 
focused on applying their limited intelligence assets to allow their forces to maneuver on 
and capture or kill an armed enemy (Dept. of Defense, Defense Science Board Task 
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Force on Defense Intelligence 34). It is impossible to get proper intelligence to 
policymakers if intelligence collection requirements are not properly balanced between 
filling counterinsurgency, counterterror, and force protection requirements (Dept. of 
Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence 30). 
Another problem identified by the Defense Science Board was the complete 
exclusion of certain ISR assets that are fundamentally important to counterinsurgency 
operations. They reported that when senior civilian and military leaders refer to 
Department of Defense ISR assets, they are commonly referring to the technical means of 
collection to the exclusion of HUMINT, open source intelligence (OSINT), and other 
information coming from the social sciences that are extremely important to 
counterinsurgency policymakers (Dept. of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force 
on Defense Intelligence 13). 
This leads into another problem. When leaders limit their view of the assets 
available, they also limit their means of collection and do not effectively or efficiently 
collect the information that is needed. The Defense Science Board found that this was the 
case as well. They found that primarily technical collection assets were used to fill 
intelligence requirements. They concluded that non-traditional means of collection 
received little support or funding (Dept. of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force 
on Defense Intelligence 14). 
All of these issues feed into the problem of counterinsurgency requirements, when 
they exist, being held at a lower priority than counterterror or force protection 
requirements (Dept. of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense 
Intelligence 14). Since September 11, 2001, there has been a significant increase in the 
number of private companies and organizations conducting analysis on unclassified 
resources. The government on the other hand decided to focus mostly on classified 
collection and analysis (Betts 4). This problem has evidently spilled over into the 
intelligence analysis in counterinsurgency operations. 
Flynn et al. propose several changes to the intelligence system to fix the problems 
they identified. One of the solutions was to have civilian analysts travel throughout 
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Afghanistan to get the desired intelligence and information and carry it back to 
headquarters (Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 10). Another solution proposed was the use 
of a written assessment instead of the PowerPoint methods used in recent years (Flynn, 
Pottinger, and Batchelor 23). Yet another solution recommended was the establishment 
and proper manning of Stability Operations Information Centers (Flynn, Pottinger, and 
Batchelor 23). 
While these solutions proposed by Flynn et al. may address a portion of the 
problem, they are also resource-intensive in an era where the United States and NATO 
are preparing to draw down forces in Afghanistan. Applying current service doctrine on 
intelligence in this case may help to solve some of the problem. Using the current 
doctrine of developing priority intelligence requirements (PIR) will help to alleviate some 
of these issues when it comes to counterinsurgency operations. The whole intelligence 
cycle begins with identifying what it is that decision makers need to know to make a 
decision. These requirements drive the whole process.   
This does not mean that the military should sit and wait for instructions from its 
elected leaders on what to collect. Military staffs should conduct proper mission analysis 
to determine what intelligence requirements pertain to the fight they face, whether that is 
a full-scale war or smaller contingencies. If the national level intelligence requirements 
exist, then the military should definitely utilize its significant resources to assist in the 
collection efforts. 
Paul R. Pillar, a former national-level intelligence officer with expertise on the 
Middle East, states that intelligence requirements at the policymaking level are developed 
by a combination of policymaker concerns and intelligence officer decisions (16). If these 
requirements are not identified early and a focused plan to attain the answers is not 
implemented, it is no wonder that policymakers do not get the information they need. The 
Marine Corps manual on intelligence states it concisely: “Once approved and distributed, 
PIRs constitute the core of the commander’s guidance for the intelligence process” (U.S. 
Dept. of the Navy, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication [MCWP] 2–1: Intelligence 
Operations 3–5). Without this core guidance, the intelligence community is rudderless. 
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Doctrine on the development of PIRs is relatively similar between joint, Army, 
and Marine Corps manuals on intelligence. They all focus on identification of 
intelligence requirements during the planning process that are then prioritized by a 
commander to answer key questions the commander or policymaker needs to answer to 
make decisions. 
C. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 
The Joint Staff, U.S. Army, and U.S. Marine Corps all use similar doctrine for 
intelligence collection. They all start with the identification of intelligence requirements. 
These requirements are then prioritized and a commander identifies which are going to be 
priority intelligence requirements. These PIR are then distilled into smaller questions that 
are tasked to assets to answer. That is why identifying the proper PIR is critical to solving 
intelligence problems in counterinsurgency operations. The answers to the PIR should 
lead to policy decisions that determine the outcome of the counterinsurgency operation. 
The U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, and the U.S. Joint Staff have similar 
processes and descriptions of the development of PIR. All the services begin with the 
identification of intelligence requirements.   Joint and Army doctrine state that the staff 
develops intelligence requirements during the mission analysis process (U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence I-8; U.S. Dept. of the Army, Army Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures [ATTP] 2–01: Planning Requirements and Assessing 
Collection 1–7, 1–8). Marine Corps doctrine dictates that the intelligence officer develops 
an initial list of proposed intelligence requirements that are refined through the mission 
analysis process. The rest of the staff and subordinate commanders help in this process of 
refining the intelligence requirements (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, MCWP 2–1: Intelligence 
Operations 3–4, 3–5). 
Once the intelligence requirements are identified, PIRs are selected from the list 
of intelligence requirements produced during the mission analysis process. In joint 
doctrine, each staff member can advocate for a specific intelligence requirement to 
become a PIR (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence I-8). The staff will 
have to take into account the requirements of higher, subordinate, and adjacent units in 
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the development of PIRs (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence I-10; U.S. 
Dept. of the Navy, MCWP 2–1: Intelligence Operations 3–5; U.S. Dept. of the Army, 
ATTP 2–01: Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection 2–4). So how are PIR 
differentiated from regular intelligence requirements? 
The Marine Corps’ manual on intelligence says that PIR are differentiated from 
normal intelligence requirements because they are tied to a specific decision the 
commander needs to make that will determine the outcome of the operation (U.S. Dept. 
of the Navy, MCWP 2–1: Intelligence Operations 3–3). Joint Publication 2–01 has a 
similar definition of PIR. It states that PIR are the intelligence requirements that are the 
most important to the commander in accomplishing his mission (U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Joint Publication [JP] 2–01: Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military 
Operations III-5). 
In the end, the commander is the final decision authority on what becomes a PIR 
in all three instances (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence I-8; U.S. Dept. 
of the Navy, MCWP 2–1: Intelligence Operations 3–5; U.S. Dept. of the Army, ATTP 2–
01: Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection 1–5). The commander should not 
have more PIRs than collection assets. Limiting the number of PIRs also keeps the 
intelligence section from overwhelming the commander with useless information and 
allows the intelligence section to focus collection and analysis efforts  (U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence I-8; U.S. Dept. of the Army, ATTP 2–01: Planning 
Requirements and Assessing Collection 1–7). PIRs should also be listed in order of 
precedence to allow for the intelligence staff to prioritize collection asset allocation to fill 
the requirement (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence I-8; U.S. Dept. of 
the Navy, MCWP 2–1: Intelligence Operations 3–5). This prioritization is never final, 
nor is the list of PIR. 
It is important to remember that PIR will change throughout military operations 
due to changes in the environment or requirements being answered. As the situation 
changes, the PIR should be updated to remove PIR that have already been answered or 
are deemed to be irrelevant due to changes in the environment (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence I-8; U.S. Dept. of the Navy, MCWP 2–1: Intelligence 
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Operations 3–5, 3–6). The prioritization should also be updated to reflect the level of 
importance of each requirement based on changes in the environment and upcoming 
decisions that will have to be made. 
Once a commander approves the PIRs, the intelligence staff should develop 
Essential Elements of Information (EEI). EEIs are more specific questions that help to 
answer a much broader PIR  (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence I-8, I-
9; U.S. Dept. of the Army, ATTP 2–01: Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection 
1–7). Collection assets are then assigned to answer the EEIs during a specific timeframe 
in the unit’s collection plan. In the U.S. Army’s doctrine, EEIs are developed from the 
PIRs. Once the EEIs are developed, specific indicators are identified that help to 
determine what the enemy is doing or how the environment is impacting operations (U.S. 
Dept. of the Army, ATTP 2–01: Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection 2–6). 
These indicators are turned into questions called specific information requirements that 
are then tasked to subordinate units or assets to be answered (U.S. Dept. of the Army, 
ATTP 2–01: Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection 2–6). 
If the PIR are developed and selected according to service and joint doctrine and 
receive command emphasis, they should be getting answered. PIR are the beginning of 
the intelligence cycle.   For the intelligence to get to the policymaker, it has to be 
analyzed and turned into a final product. This is where intelligence assessment 
production comes into play. 
Production of intelligence assessments should be linked to the PIR approved by 
the commander (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence I-2). The 
identification of information that fulfills a PIR is a function for the whole staff. 
Information arrives at a headquarters in different forms. Each staff section should identify 
which pieces of information satisfy requirements and provide those to the intelligence 
section (U.S. Dept. of the Army, ATTP 2–01: Planning Requirements and Assessing 
Collection 4–3). Intelligence fusion consists of using all sources of information available 
to answer a given requirement while avoiding bias and deception (U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, JP 2–0: Joint Intelligence II-11). 
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In the next chapter, different approaches to counterinsurgency operations will be 
reviewed. These approaches will be used to find similarities and to identify key 
components that counterinsurgency operations must address. In Chapter III, these key 
components will be used to identify proposed PIR that can be modified to fit the 
environment and provide the information needed by policymakers. The final chapter will 
address how to write an assessment that provides the information needed by 
policymakers to make effective policy decisions with regard to counterinsurgency 
operations. 
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II. COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 
A. WHAT IS AN INSURGENCY? 
The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide defines insurgency as, “the 
organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of 
a region. As such it is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force 
to create space for their political, economic and influence activities to be effective” 
(Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 2). This definition of insurgency is similar to the one 
encompassed in Joint Publication (JP) 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations. JP 3–24 
states that the use of violent means and subversion to attain a political goal of either 
overthrowing a sitting government or forcing it to change is an insurgency (U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations I-1). 
The Army and Marine Corps manual on counterinsurgency operations, the Field 
Manual (FM) 3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3–33.5: 
Counterinsurgency, shows two extremes of how sitting governments are removed from 
power. The first example it gives is a “spontaneous explosion of popular will” such as the 
French Revolution in 1789 (U.S. Dept. of the Army, FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5: 
Counterinsurgency 1–2). The other extreme is depicted as the coup d’état where a small 
group of conspirators overthrows a government with little initial support from the 
population (U.S. Dept. of the Army, FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5: Counterinsurgency 1–2). 
FM 3–24 states that insurgency falls somewhere between these two ends of the 
continuum of internal wars (U.S. Dept. of the Army, FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5: 
Counterinsurgency 1–2). 
David Galula has a similar explanation of an insurgency. Galula states there are 
three ways to wrest power from a government: revolution, plot, and insurgency. He 
defines a revolution the same way the FM 3–24 does and used the same example of the 
French Revolution (Galula 2). Plots differ from revolution in the number of people 
needed to execute them and because, according to Galula, revolutions are an “accident” 
which cannot be predicted but are explainable after they occur (Galula 2). Plots consist of 
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the same characteristics as the coup d’état described in FM 3–24. Galula states that the 
planning of a plot may take a significant amount of time, but the action is brief in 
duration and requires little public support to gain its initial objective of overthrowing a 
government (Galula 2). Galula uses these examples to paint a picture of the differences 
between these two methods of overthrowing a government and insurgencies. Galula 
states that insurgencies are, “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, 
in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading to the final overthrow of the 
existing order” (Galula 2). 
Based on these definitions and explanations, insurgencies are violent and/or non-
violent means used to change a social or political order over a protracted period of time. 
This definition of an insurgency is important to understand because it helps to classify 
events for a person studying them for the purpose of determining how to defeat them. 
Now that we have a definition we need to know how an insurgency works to help further 
define what methods an insurgency uses to better be able to determine what needs to be 
known to defeat them. 
B. METHODS OF CONDUCTING AN INSURGENCY 
Insurgencies are vastly different when compared to each other because they 
develop in different environments with different people, institutions, and cultures 
(Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 11; Kitson 32). According to the U.S. Government 
Counterinsurgency Guide, all these insurgencies generally develop, “through some or all 
the stages of subversion and radicalization, popular unrest, civil disobedience, localized 
guerrilla activity, and widespread guerrilla warfare to open, semi-conventional armed 
conflict” (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 11). This progression tends to be slow and 
methodical because of the difference between the government’s capabilities and the 
insurgent’s capabilities at the beginning of an insurgency (Galula 3). The insurgency is 
not strong enough to contest the government outright at the beginning of the conflict 
(Galula 5). Most combatants prefer a quick and easy knock-out blow to end a conflict, 
but insurgents are forced to look for slow and protracted ways of warfare to counter the 
government (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations II-1). 
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This is due to the assets the government can leverage in a crisis, especially at the 
beginning of the conflict. 
The government has the ability to leverage its security forces, diplomatic 
relationships, all branches of government, money, logistics systems, and communication 
systems. The insurgent has the ability to leverage its cause. It can use this cause to help 
grow throughout the conflict as long as it is successful (Galula 3–4). Insurgencies are said 
to, “start with nothing but a cause and grow to strength” (Kitson 29). The cause that the 
insurgent chooses is extremely important to the success of the insurgency. The cause is 
used to develop the insurgency’s ideology and is the driving force behind recruiting 
people to the insurgent’s camp at the outset of the conflict (Galula 8). Frank Kitson 
explained it simply by saying, “it is in men’s minds that wars of subversion have to be 
fought and decided” (31). 
There are many methods of conducting insurgencies proposed by people such as 
Mao Tse Zedong, Giap, and others, but Frank Kitson states that they are not necessary. 
There are only two things that an insurgent leader must accomplish. He must gain some 
support from the population and either militarily defeat the government in battle or harass 
the government until it loses its support (Kitson 32). In some cases, this may be easier 
than it seems for according to Sir Robert Thompson the government only has around 15% 
of the population as hardcore supporters and 85% are neutral and are available for 
recruiting to either side of the conflict (63). Malaya proved to be different, where the 
insurgency was primarily communist and was seen as Chinese in origin and therefore had 
little chance of outright success (Thompson 63). The problem that the Malayan 
government faced was how to win over portions of the Chinese population of Malaya in 
order to defeat the insurgency (Thompson 63). This is similar to what the majority Shia 
government of Iraq needs to do with the Sunni population of Iraq. The insurgency, on the 
other hand, needs to procure the support of a portion populace and maintain it throughout 
the conflict (Kitson 32). A good cause or core grievance will help to accomplish this. 
The cause must be one that the government cannot claim as its own; for if it does 
the insurgent will lose (Galula 13). According to David Galula the crisis in Malaya shows 
what happens when the government claims the insurgent’s cause as its own. The 
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communist insurgency claimed Malayan independence of British rule as its cause. The 
British effectively took the wind out of the sails of the insurgency by declaring their 
intention of granting Malaya independence (Galula 13). 
JP 3–24 lists several causes or core grievances that insurgents typically 
manipulate to support their ends: identity, religion, economy, corruption, repression, 
foreign exploitation or presence, occupation, and essential services (U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations II-7). Causes linked to identity can cause 
significant tension between a population and the government and gain support from other 
governments or diaspora (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency 
Operations II-7). Sir Robert Thompson gave an example by using nationalism as a cause. 
He stated that nationalism could be used to separate the insurgency from the population 
and can also do the opposite. He states that the United States calling the insurgency in 
Vietnam the Viet Cong gave the insurgency the ability to claim nationalism as a cause 
when the United States used the term Viet in the description of the guerrillas. Thompson 
thought that the United States should have named the guerrillas something that made it 
harder for the guerrillas to claim a nationalist identity (Thompson 64). 
The use of religion as a cause has similar characteristics as causes incorporating 
identity. It can set a religious group at odds with a government and draw on support from 
the co-religionists in other countries (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: 
Counterinsurgency Operations II-7). Religion can be used by the insurgency to harness 
strong emotions on the part of the population if they believe the government is 
conducting a war against their religion (Thompson 64). 
The economy can also be used as a core grievance by an insurgency. The unequal 
distribution of wealth or a lack of jobs can be used to turn the population against a 
government (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations II-7). 
The government can make significant progress in gaining support from the populace by 
improving the economy (Thompson 66). Conversely, the insurgency can use a lack of 
economic improvement or jobs as a cause. Gamaa Islamiyah used this grievance to 
recruit people to its cause in Egypt during the 1990s (Kepel 284). Gamaa Islamiyah 
capitalized on the lack of jobs for graduates of Egyptian schools due to a down turn in the 
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price of oil. Egypt was unable to provide the jobs needed for these educated people. 
Gamaa Islamiyah combined the economic cause with a religious cause by saying that 
Egypt’s Christian Copts were getting an unequal share of money and influence in the 
government (Kepel 284). 
A common core grievance that is closely tied to the economy is corruption. 
Corruption in the political system leads to a decrease in the government’s legitimacy 
(U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations II-7). The revolution 
that occurred in Tunisia in 2011 is an example of this.   Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s family 
was deemed to be so corrupt and their lifestyles so opulent that it caused widespread 
outrage because the corruption was impacting job creation and the economy (Goldstone 
11). Ben Ali’s wife was particularly corrupt. She and her family took corruption to new 
heights by requiring businessmen to build her new mansions (Goldstone 12). 
A government can also provide fuel to an insurgency through excessive 
repression, yet it must have capacity, and willingness, to suppress the insurgents. 
Repression can provide a cause to the insurgency and also degrade government 
legitimacy (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations II-7). The 
Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual produced in 1940 states, “Abuses by officials in 
power and their oppression of followers of the party not in power, are often the seeds of 
revolution.” (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter I: Introduction” 21)  These repressive 
leaders provide the catalyst that leads to the revolution or insurgency. (U.S. Dept. of the 
Navy, “Chapter I: Introduction” 21)  Sir Robert Thompson states that the insurgency will 
use these governmental excesses to help fuel the insurgency’s information operations 
(Thompson 35). 
The presence of foreign military force or an occupation can also provide the cause 
for an insurgency. (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations II-
7)  Frank Kitson uses the example of the communists in Vietnam prior to the Vietnam 
War as an example. Although the core cause of the communists was to establish 
communist control of all of Vietnam, which they knew had little appeal with the 
populace, they gained popular support by claiming their cause was the expulsion of the 
French occupiers (Kitson 30). When World War II ensued, they changed their cause to 
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expelling the Japanese occupiers. When that war ended, the cause again reverted to 
expelling the French (Kitson 30). 
The lack of essential services also can provide a cause for an insurgency. The 
population will seek out an administration that can provide essential services and support 
whoever provides them (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency 
Operations II-7). 
Any one of these causes or any combination of these causes can be harnessed to 
propel an insurgency to grow in scope, if they gain the support of the populace. Frank 
Kitson states that the cause must have mass appeal, if it does not it must be adjusted to 
gain more support. If it has lost support it must be changed to gain back support. If it is 
impossible to find or adjust a cause or core grievance to gain support, than the insurgency 
must be abandoned because it is doomed to fail (Kitson 29). 
Before open hostilities begin it is also important for most insurgencies to establish 
a party to gain the support of the population. The party needs to expand to gain the 
support of more and more of the population. This support is provided in the form of 
supplies, money, intelligence, or just remaining neutral and non-committal to either side 
in the conflict (Kitson 35). The party that is developed takes the cause or core grievance 
and uses that to increase the support for the insurgency (Kitson 48; U.S. Dept. of the 
Navy, “Chapter I: Introduction” 20). 
Once the party is established or while it is being established, the insurgency is 
weak. Faced with the vast difference in capabilities it would be ludicrous for an insurgent 
to try to fight the government on the government’s terms. The insurgent must therefore 
find another method of contesting the government. Sir Robert Thompson sums up what 
the insurgent needs to accomplish by stating: 
It is the secret of guerilla forces that, to be successful, they must hold the 
initiative, attack selected targets at a time of their choosing and avoid 
battle when the odds are against them. If they can maintain their offensive 
this way, both their strength and their morale automatically increase until 
victory is won. As a corollary, it must be the aim of the counter-guerilla 
forces to compel guerilla forces to go on the defensive so that they lose the 
initiative, become dispersed and expend their energy on mere existence. 
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Their condition then changes from one of automatic expansion to one of 
certain contraction, as a result of which both their strength and their 
morale steadily decline. (Thompson 115–16) 
In short, the insurgency “wins by not losing” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: 
Counterinsurgency Operations II-3). The continued existence and effectiveness of the 
insurgency will degrade the government’s capabilities and control of the population (U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations II-3). Insurgents contest 
the government by trying to remove the population’s acquiescence to the government 
(Galula 4). 
The insurgent accomplishes this by perpetrating disorder and insecurity (Galula 6; 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations II-3). It is much 
easier and cheaper for the insurgent to create disorder and insecurity than it is for the 
government to maintain order (Galula 6; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: 
Counterinsurgency Operations II-3). The government must address the disorder because 
that is what the population expects the government to do (Galula 7). The government 
faces the fact that it has assets that it must protect and a responsibility to the population to 
do so. The insurgent does not face such a problem, lacking assets that it must protect and 
the lack of responsibility to a population allows it to operate more freely than the 
government (Galula 7; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency 
Operations II-3). 
The insurgency must choose a cause with mass appeal and maintain that appeal 
by either adding more causes or adjusting the cause to maintain the support of the 
populace. They must establish a party to keep the cause in the minds of the populace and 
to gain the support of the populace. Lastly they must contest government control.  This is 
sometimes accomplished through direct military confrontation or by harassing the 
government until it loses legitimacy. So what must the government and its allies do to 
defeat and insurgency faced with the inflexibility that goes with its responsibilities? 
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C. COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 
In his book, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and 
Vietnam, Sir Robert Thompson wrote two simple equations that he claims determine the 
outcome of insurgent warfare. First, he wrote: “legality + construction + results = the 
government.” Then, he wrote: “illegality + destruction + promises = the insurgents” 
(Thompson 68). These very simple equations help describe but do not explain effective 
counterinsurgency operations. 
The first thing to understand about counterinsurgency operations is that the 
military may not be able to defeat the insurgency by itself (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, 
“Chapter I: Introduction” 15; Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 2; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations III-3). Nonmilitary means are more effective in 
reestablishing government control (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 2). The U.S. 
Government Counterinsurgency Guide states that the intended end state of 
counterinsurgency operations “is a government that is seen as legitimate, controlling 
social, political, economic and security institutions that meet the population’s needs, 
including adequate mechanisms to address the grievances that may have fueled support of 
the insurgency” (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 4). This matches with the first of the three 
conditions for counterinsurgency success outlined in JP 3–24. They are a government that 
controls the social, political, economic, and security apparatuses legitimately; the 
isolation of the insurgency from the population; and the reintegration of insurgent group 
member and leaders into society (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency 
Operations III-5). 
The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual further explains the objective of 
counterinsurgency operations by stating that small wars are, “undertaken under executive 
authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or 
external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or 
unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the 
foreign policy of our Nation” (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter I: Introduction” 1). The 
manual further states that approaches to supporting another government can be as small 
as providing an “administrative assistant” to the other extreme of the United States 
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military taking over the role of governing a nation (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter I: 
Introduction” 1). 
A foreign military taking over the administrative functions of a supported 
government can give the insurgency additional causes to utilize. The adoption of such an 
extreme policy is not the best scenario. The Small Wars Manual only advocates this 
option in extreme cases and specifies handing control of the government back to the civil 
authorities as soon as possible (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter XV: Withdrawal” 1). JP 
3–24 also advocates transitioning government control back to the supported government 
as soon as they are capable assuming responsibility (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: 
Counterinsurgency Operations I-6). Sir Robert Thompson thought that the British 
ensuring Malaya had fully trained and functioning departments of government was one 
difference between the successful counterinsurgency operations the British conducted 
and the unsuccessful ones conducted by the United States in Vietnam (71). 
What options are chosen to assist a government depends on the situation. The U.S. 
Government Counterinsurgency Guide states that an effective counterinsurgency strategy 
must address two issues. It should address political considerations and population 
security. These two issues must be given equal weight because an insurgency is an 
“armed political competition” (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 18). 
Sir Robert Thompson’s five principles of counterinsurgency follow along similar 
lines. He states that first the government should seek to be independent, united, and 
economically stable (Thompson 50). This requires the government to establish its 
authority through focusing on its administrative structure by training government 
employees. It must also address corruption quickly so that it does not become another 
cause that the insurgency can claim (Thompson 50–52). The U.S. Government 
Counterinsurgency Guide states that the success of counterinsurgency operations depends 
on the government’s ability and willingness to reform and address core grievances 
(Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 2). Even the best-planned operations in support of a 
government will fail if these grievances are not addressed (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 
3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations III-4). 
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His second principle states that the government must obey the law and not enact 
laws that can be interpreted as discriminatory towards a segment of the population. The 
fact that insurgents who violate the law must be prosecuted goes without saying, but 
government officials who break the law must also face the consequences (Thompson 52–
4). The use of legitimate organizations as well as force when needed to establish law and 
order is important (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter I: Introduction” 7). Prosecutions of 
corrupt government officials and insurgents must be and appear to be legitimate. This 
will help in establishing law and order through legitimate organizations (U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations III-15). One of the goals of 
counterinsurgency operations must be to bolster the legitimacy of government institutions 
in front of its people (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations 
III-1). After all a government that does not abide by its own constitution seriously 
undermines any efforts at effective counterinsurgency operations (Thompson 66). 
Additionally portraying the insurgency as criminals causes them to lose support (U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations III-15). 
This depends on how legitimate the supported government appears to be to the 
populace. Perception of illegitimacy or corruption in a government institution can lead to 
the use of the insurgency’s institutions if they are thought to be less corrupt. For example, 
in Afghanistan, the Taliban placed courts in each of the districts it controls (Nelson). The 
local populace used the Taliban courts to settle property disputes and in some instances 
murder trials were conducted. These courts are used because the Afghan government’s 
courts were deemed to be illegitimate and justice went to those who could afford it 
(Nelson). 
The third principle is that the government must have a synchronized plan 
(Thompson 55). The plan must include police, military, political, economic, and social 
efforts to subdue the insurgency. The plan must prioritize actions and locations for those 
actions. The intent behind this plan is to force the guerrillas to have to react to the 
government rather than the other way around (Thompson 55). 
The fourth principle is that the government security forces and its allies must 
focus on defeating shadow governments over armed insurgents. Thompson argues that 
 25
the government should focus on the individuals who move from the population to the 
guerrillas and back. When this group of people is targeted, it forces the armed groups to 
have to fight to survive (Thompson 55–57). This meets one of the requirements of the 
Small Wars Manual that states that operations should focus on stopping support from 
reaching the insurgents (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter I: Introduction” 7). Frank 
Kitson states that looking back at counterinsurgency operations it is clear that one of the 
first steps a government should undertake is the destruction of the political apparatus of 
the insurgency in order to deny it access to the population (67). 
The last principle is that the government must secure its large population areas 
first and then work out from there (Thompson 57–58). According to joint doctrine this 
should be the main focus of the military commander under the directions of the civilian 
leadership (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: Counterinsurgency Operations III-2). 
This security is hampered by the fact that as the guerrilla operations progress the 
government’s forces will feel the need to place small units to secure critical infrastructure 
throughout the area it controls. This will give the insurgency more targets to choose from 
and has the tendency of creating gentlemen’s agreements where the local units agree not 
to leave their installations if the insurgents agree not to attack them (Thompson 41). 
Often the outcome of the conflict for control of the population is determined by which 
side “gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is likely to 
win,… So much the better, of course, if popularity and effectiveness are combined” 
(Galula 8–9). 
Accomplishing all the tasks listed above takes time. Counterinsurgency operations 
can take decades to be successful (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: 
Counterinsurgency Operations III-16). It takes time to build administrative capacity, 
build legitimate institutions, develop a synchronized plan to defeat the insurgency, defeat 
shadow governments, and establish security. It also requires intelligence. In the next 
chapter intelligence requirements will be identified that will provide the civilian and 
military leadership the information they need to be successful in counterinsurgency 
operations. 
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III. WHAT INFORMATION DO POLICYMAKERS AND 
MILITARY COMMANDERS NEED TO WIN THE 
COUNTERINSURGENCY? 
In the absence of intelligence requirements levied from national level 
policymakers, the military must determine what intelligence requirements need to be 
answered to effectively deal with the situations they face. The intelligence requirements 
needed for combat operations may be different from those needed for counterinsurgency. 
Policymakers and military commanders require information on the support structure of 
the insurgency to be able to implement effective operations and policy during 
counterinsurgency operations. They need to understand how the insurgency is getting 
food, money, recruits, medicine, equipment, and intelligence to be successful. Having 
this information will help commanders and policymakers develop courses of action to 
interdict this support and cause the insurgency to degrade.   
To be effective, the host-nation government must support counterinsurgency 
operations and work to bolster the government’s legitimacy. That is why it is important 
for policymakers and military commanders to know the extent to which the host-nation 
government supports counterinsurgency operations. Identifying the agencies or people 
who are not supporting effective counterinsurgency practices will help policymakers and 
military commanders know what aspects of a government to focus resources on and who 
are the corrupt individuals that need to be prosecuted. Understanding how effectively a 
host-nation government supports counterinsurgency operations will also assist 
policymakers with the important decision of whether to intervene in the first place, and 
how long to stay. 
Additionally, understanding how the insurgency is manipulating the population to 
degrade support for the government will help policymakers and commanders develop 
plans to assist a receptive host-nation government with addressing core grievances. 
Addressing core grievances will determine whether counterinsurgency operations are 
successful or not (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 2; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: 
Counterinsurgency Operations III-4; U.S. Dept. of the Army, FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5: 
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Counterinsurgency 1–4). These three requirements are not exhaustive. The first two are 
supported by two recent studies conducted by the RAND Corporation: Victory has a 
Thousand Fathers and Paths to Victory. Joint and service doctrine as well as the U.S. 
Government Counterinsurgency Guide support the third. Obviously, some information on 
the insurgents themselves will be needed to help with conducting security operations such 
as offensive targeting operations, but collection on insurgents should be balanced with 
collection to answer the priority intelligence requirements proposed in this chapter.   
Focusing intelligence assets too heavily on the enemy leads to some of the problems 
discussed in the first chapter. A balanced approach to counterinsurgency achieves the 
best results.    
In 2010, the RAND Corporation conducted a study to determine what approaches 
to counterinsurgency operations are successful when they are properly employed. The 
RAND Corporation compiled their results in the book Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: 
Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency. The authors determined that the 
counterinsurgency practices prescribed in the FM 3–24, “received strong empirical 
support” (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in 
Counterinsurgency 60). They characterized the practices written in the FM 3–24 with 
nine factors, which we discussed in the previous chapter:  the COIN force established a 
perception of security in the areas it controlled, government legitimacy improved through 
reduction in corruption and improved governance, grievances were addressed, the COIN 
force improved relations with the populace, basic services were provided by the COIN 
force or the supported government, short-term infrastructure improvement was 
accomplished in areas under government control, the population provided intelligence to 
the government, a majority of the population supported the government, and the COIN 
force avoided culturally offending the populace (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a 
Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 59–60). 
In their study, they evaluated thirty insurgencies started after World War II and 
ended by the time the study was conducted. Of those thirty cases, eight were determined 
to be victories for the side conducting counterinsurgency operations. Of the eight 
victories, seven counterinsurgent forces had employed at least three factors of the 
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approach detailed in the FM 3–24. Of the twenty-two counterinsurgent force losses, only 
one counterinsurgent force had employed three of the factors of the FM 3–24 (Paul, 
Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in 
Counterinsurgency 60). 
In 2013, RAND conducted a followup to expand on the previous study. It 
included more cases and sought to answer additional questions that the first study did not 
answer. This time the results were recorded in the book Paths to Victory: Lessons from 
Modern Insurgencies. In this book, the authors also considered the approach dictated in 
the FM 3–24 and had similar findings. The authors also utilized the same nine factors of 
the FM 3–24 they identified in Victory has a Thousand Fathers (Paul et al., Paths to 
Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies 114–5). The authors reviewed fifty-nine 
cases. Nineteen were determined to be counterinsurgent force victories (Paul et al., Paths 
to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies 116). Again, the authors of the study 
determined that the “FM 3–24 receives strong empirical support” (Paul et al., Paths to 
Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies 115). All of the cases in which the authors 
determined that the counterinsurgent force had won employed at least four factors of the 
FM 3–24 in their counterinsurgency operations. The authors also determined that the 
counterinsurgent force that lost employed four or more of the factors prescribed in the 
FM 3–24 (Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies 115). 
The FM 3–24 and other literature on counterinsurgency operations cover a lot of 
material. Of the approaches recommended by the FM 3–24 and other historical 
documents, which ones are the most important for shortening the duration of an 
insurgency and ensuring the victory of the counterinsurgent?  Based on these approaches, 
what information is needed to successfully employ these approaches?  The two studies 
mentioned above will help the intelligence community focus on the information that is 
important to providing proper intelligence support to counterinsurgency policymakers 
and military commanders. 
Based on their study, the authors of Victory Has a Thousand Fathers came up 
with seven recommendations that they believe would lead to government victory in 
counterinsurgency operations. The first two recommendations are linked. They are: “Plan 
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to pursue multiple mutually supporting lines of operation in COIN” and “Build and 
maintain forces that are capable of engaging in multiple mutually supporting lines of 
operation simultaneously” (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: 
Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 94). The authors found in their study that 
successful counterinsurgent forces tend to implement more good counterinsurgency 
practices than detrimental ones (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: 
Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 95). They also determined that there is no set 
number of good practices required to win, but it is important for the counterinsurgent 
force and government to employ as many of the good practices as possible; thus the first 
two recommendations (Paul, Clarke, and, Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: 
Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 95). This finding was confirmed in the 
subsequent study detailed in Paths to Victory (Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from 
Modern Insurgencies 181). 
The next recommendation the authors had was: “Ensure the positive involvement 
of the host-nation government” (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand 
Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 95). The authors determined that the 
list of good practices they came up with was only successfully employed when 
counterinsurgent forces and the governments they were supporting both employed them. 
If the counterinsurgent force employed the good practices and the government did not, 
the outcomes were not favorable (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand 
Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 96). Sir Robert Thompson would 
agree with this recommendation. He made a similar comment when he wrote, “Finally, if 
its cause is to be effective, the government must demonstrate both its determination and 
its capacity to win. These are the foundations of popular support… After all there are not 
many backers to a losing side” (Thompson 69). The United States Marine Corps’ Small 
Wars Manual, written in 1940, proposed going as far as having the military replace the 
civilian institutions if they are not fully supporting these operations (U.S. Dept. of the 
Navy, “Chapter I: Introduction” 7). This demonstrates the importance of host-nation 
government support to counterinsurgency operations. 
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In the end, the government and counterinsurgent force wins when they apply 
more good practices of counterinsurgency then bad (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has 
a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 96). This led to the 
authors’ fourth recommendation: “Keep a scorecard of good versus bad factors and 
practices; if the balance does not correspond to the desired outcome, make changes” 
(Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in 
Counterinsurgency 96). This recommendation leads to the fifth recommendation: 
“Recognize that there is time to adapt” (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand 
Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 97). The authors found in the study 
that initial failure of counterinsurgent forces to apply proper counterinsurgency practices 
did not necessarily dictate the final outcome of the operations. The counterinsurgent 
forces usually had time to change and implement new practices and strategies to 
effectively defeat the insurgency (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand 
Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 97). 
The sixth recommendation of the authors was: “Avoid using and discourage allies 
and partners from using repression and collective punishment in COIN” (Paul, Clarke, 
and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 
98). The results of the study showed that overly aggressive practices could win phases 
but usually ultimately led to the defeat of the government and counterinsurgent forces 
(Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in 
Counterinsurgency 98). Of the eight counterinsurgency government victories the authors 
studied, only two applied repressive techniques, but they also applied enough good 
practices to counter the effects of their repressive acts (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory 
Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 98). In Paths to 
Victory, the authors came to the same conclusion, stating that the repressive approach to 
counterinsurgency proved to be extremely ineffectual (Paul et al., Paths to Victory: 
Lessons from Modern Insurgencies 181). 
The final recommendation of the authors of Victory has a Thousand Fathers was: 
“Ascertain the specific support needs of and sources of support for insurgent adversaries 
and target them” (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of 
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Success in Counterinsurgency 99). The authors of the study found that the insurgent’s 
ability to receive “tangible” (not necessarily indigenous) support could predict the 
outcome of all thirty cases included in their study. In the eight counterinsurgent victories 
they studied, the government and its counterinsurgent forces were able to disrupt or stifle 
at least three aspects of insurgent support (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a 
Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency 98). The ten aspects of 
insurgent support the authors identified in their study were reduce cross-border support, 
reduce internal support, reduce external support, interfere with insurgent resupply 
activities, reduce the insurgency’s ability to grow or stabilize in size, increase the cost of 
the insurgency’s normal processes, reduce insurgent recruiting, interfere with insurgent’s 
material procurement system, reduce the intelligence the insurgency receives, and reduce 
insurgent financing (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of 
Success in Counterinsurgency 70). 
The authors also were able to determine that when the insurgents do not have the 
support of the population and get their support from exogenous forces, victory for 
counterinsurgent forces was achieved through successfully interdicting the support 
coming from outside the conflict area rather than focusing on popular support (Paul, 
Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in 
Counterinsurgency 98). Attacking an insurgent’s support structure is not a new approach 
to counterinsurgency. The U.S. Marine Corps advocated for military operations to focus 
on cutting off support from reaching insurgents in its 1940 Small Wars Manual (U.S. 
Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter I: Introduction” 7). 
The 2013 study conducted by the RAND Corporation considered seventy-one 
insurgencies conducted since World War II and ended by 2010 (Paul et al., Paths to 
Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies 179). As stated earlier, this study confirmed 
the findings from the previous study that counterinsurgent force victory was usually 
achieved through the employment of multiple good counterinsurgency practices (Paul et 
al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies 181). The authors of Paths to 
Victory were able to narrow down the number of counterinsurgency concepts to the three 
most important ones as a result of their study. They determined that reducing the tangible 
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support available to the insurgency, the commitment of the counterinsurgent force and 
the host-nation government to the counterinsurgency effort, and a flexible and adaptive 
counterinsurgent force were imperative to the victory of counterinsurgent forces (Paul et 
al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies 182). 
To allow the supported government and the counterinsurgent force to properly 
disrupt or interdict support for the insurgency, the first Priority Intelligence Requirement 
should be, “What is the structure and sources of the insurgency’s support?”  Fully 
illuminating the structure of the insurgent’s support system will allow better analysis and 
recommendations on how to interdict this support. After all, an insurgency that has no 
money, food, or equipment cannot sustain itself. Che Guevara’s insurgent operations in 
Bolivia are an example of this.   His insurgency in Bolivia failed because he was unable 
to gain food to sustain the fighters he had and unable to recruit any more fighters (Kitson 
34). 
The second PIR should be, “What host-nation government officials or institutions 
are not effectively supporting counterinsurgency operations?”  When this question is 
answered it will help determine who is negatively impacting the progress of 
counterinsurgency operations and may help to illuminate whom counterinsurgent forces 
should seek to work with and whom they should attempt to marginalize or remove, if that 
is an option. In the case of special operations forces, it may help to determine which 
security forces to partner with and which to avoid.  
This PIR may also identify government agencies that need significant reform in 
order to meet the needs of the populace. Answering this requirement will help 
policymakers make the important decision of whether to get involved, and once involved, 
whether to stay. It will also help policymakers and military commanders identify corrupt 
officials who may be supporting the insurgency, giving the supported government the 
opportunity to improve their legitimacy by prosecuting these ineffective and criminal 
officials. 
The third PIR should be, “How is the insurgency manipulating the population to 
degrade support for the government?”  Although this proposed PIR is not supported by 
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the RAND study, the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide states that it is 
important for the government to address the grievances of the population in order to gain 
or maintain the population’s support (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 19). Additionally, JP 
3–24 states, “the population is the critical dimension of successful COIN.”  It goes on to 
state “understanding the population requires an intimate knowledge of the causes and 
ongoing grievances of the insurgency” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3–24: 
Counterinsurgency Operations III-1). This PIR will help answer the previous two PIRs 
and may provide topics for counterinsurgent information operations to address. It may 
also provide information on what grievances the government may need to correct to take 
away the cause that the insurgency is using to gain support. 
A. PIR #1: WHAT IS THE STRUCTURE AND SOURCES OF THE 
INSURGENCY’S SUPPORT? 
To help identify what the insurgent support structure looks like, the intelligence 
community would need to identify the sources and methods of insurgent recruiting; the 
methods and sources of insurgent financing; the locations where insurgents store their 
food, medicine, ammunition, and weapons; the sources of the insurgent’s supply of 
weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies. 
Identifying the sources and methods of insurgent recruiting may help to provide 
information on how to counter the insurgents’ efforts to gain personnel or replace 
personnel lost in their operations and make it harder to continue operations. Identifying 
the method of recruiting may also help to determine which members of the insurgency 
are hard-core and which ones may be susceptible to amnesty programs. 
Sir Robert Thompson broke down insurgent recruits into three categories. The 
first category of recruit was what Thompson referred to as the “natural” (Thompson 35). 
According to Thompson, this category of insurgent is composed of ideologues to 
common criminals who may have suffered some sort of setback in life like the loss of a 
job, or failed a key exam, and may have a criminal record (35). These people may be 
harder to win over with amnesty programs because they are seeking to change the society 
(Thompson 35). They probably will not be susceptible to moderate concessions and 
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amnesty programs provided by the government. These individuals may need to be the 
target of information operations focused at discrediting them or raids to arrest or kill 
them. 
The second category of recruit is the “converted” (Thompson 35). This category 
is composed of people who believe that they or someone they know has suffered an 
injustice at the hands of the government (Thompson 35). According to Thompson, this 
group is also composed of people who jumped onto the bandwagon when they perceived 
that the insurgency was sure to win (35). Gaining their support may be as simple as 
offering amnesty after the tide has been turned in favor of the government and 
counterinsurgent forces. To win over those who perceived that they, or someone they 
know, suffered an injustice at the hands of the government might require a bit more work. 
Such things as trials of government officials responsible for the injustice and reforms of 
institutions combined with amnesty programs could possibly pull some of these people 
back on the government’s side. 
The third and final category of insurgent recruit Thompson identified was the 
“deceived” (36). This category includes people who joined the insurgency for what they 
considered to be good reasons and then were indoctrinated into the insurgents’ cause. 
According to Thompson, this category can include such cases as child soldiers, like the 
ones seen in Africa. These children can be victims of kidnapping who are hidden and 
indoctrinated by the insurgents (Thompson 36). These children are then led on a mission 
to attack an undefended village. The insurgents use the killing of the villagers by these 
children in an attempt to make the children feel guilty and thereby intensifying their 
identification with the insurgency (Thompson 36). This category of insurgent is probably 
the most susceptible to government amnesty programs. 
If the insurgency is gaining recruits through the use of kidnapping or other 
criminal activity, it may dictate to a commander that additional resources need to be 
applied to counter this type of criminal activity. It also may indicate to policymakers that 
increased penalties for kidnapping may be needed to help increase the cost of conducting 
such criminal activity. 
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Identifying how the insurgents are recruiting members may also help with trying 
to get these recruits back on the side of the government. Offers of amnesty, jobs, or food 
could be used to help with causing defections when combined with operations aimed at 
cutting off support to the insurgency. Cutting off this support would also help with 
keeping people from joining the insurgency. 
People would be less likely to accept the risk of joining an insurgent group if their 
future could foreseeably include hunger, significant injury, or inadequate equipment. 
Identifying the sources of finance and supply and interdicting them combined with other 
good counterinsurgency practices can expedite counterinsurgent and government victory. 
One example of this is the insurgency that occurred in El Salvador from 1979 to 1992. 
The government of El Salvador gradually improved its human rights records and its 
governance leading to a stalemate with the insurgents that was slightly in favor of the 
government in 1988 (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed 
Counterinsurgency Case Studies 41). In 1992, the collapse of the Soviet Union cut the 
external support the insurgency relied on. This significant decrease in support and the 
improved institutions of governance made the El Salvadorian government’s amnesty 
proposal palatable to the insurgents and ended the conflict (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies 41). 
Senegal is another example of how the loss of tangible support can drive 
insurgents to accept reasonable government amnesty programs. In 1982, an insurgent 
group formed advocating for the separation of a portion of Senegal (Paul, Clarke, and 
Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies 77). In 
1989, an increase in arms smuggling from the countries surrounding the area controlled 
by the separatist movement provided enough support that the insurgents no longer needed 
to rely on local support and then became increasingly violent toward the local population 
(Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency 
Case Studies 79). 
The conflict was forced to an end when the government’s reforms were combined 
with an amnesty program that paid insurgents not to fight, and surrounding countries 
were pressured to cut support to the insurgents (Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a 
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Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies 80). When this external 
support was significantly diminished, the insurgency could not turn back to the populace 
for support due to their heavy-handed treatment of the population (Paul, Clarke, and 
Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies 82). 
This case shows the importance of identifying countries providing support for the 
insurgency so that government agencies can apply pressure and diplomatic means to stem 
the flow of support across borders. 
Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr. proposed this approach to counterinsurgency 
operations in 1970. They stated that focusing on cutting off the sources of internal and 
external support for rebellions forces guerrillas to have to stop fighting and focus on 
“production” (Leites and Wolf 77). This shift from fighting makes the guerrillas 
extremely vulnerable to government and counterinsurgent operations. They also thought 
that operations wholly focused on killing or capturing insurgents were doomed to fail 
because with the support network still intact, the guerrillas could replace what they lost 
(Leites and Wolf 77). Leites and Wolf state that a balanced approach of targeting the 
insurgents and the support network is the key to successful counterinsurgency operations, 
“Waging successful counterinsurgency thus requires that attention be devoted to counter-
production efforts, rather than counterforce efforts alone. R’s [guerrillas] armed forces 
are not unimportant for A’s [government] targeting, but they are less important than R’s 
organization and logistic network in reducing R’s effectiveness” (Leites and Wolf 78). 
This approach requires significant government effort to help stem the flow of 
support to the insurgents operating in their country. Whether the sources of supply for the 
insurgency are internal or external the government and its security institutions will be 
relied upon to help cut the insurgents off from their supply. Border security organizations 
and customs officials are particularly important to impeding the flow of external support 
and police are extremely important to cutting off sources of internal support to the 
insurgency (Leites and Wolf 76). With this in mind, it is important to understand the 
extent to which the host-nation government supports the counterinsurgency operations. 
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B. PIR #2: WHICH HOST–NATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS  
OR INSTITUTIONS ARE NOT EFECTIVELY SUPPORTING 
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS? 
The intelligence community should focus on trying to identify reforms that the 
government (local, regions, district, and/or national) needs to make to ensure that further 
grievances are not created. The intelligence community should also seek to identify 
corrupt or inefficient government officials and agencies to be removed or reformed in 
order to help determine how effectively the host-nation government is supporting 
counterinsurgency efforts. Corrupt officials and inefficient government agencies help 
contribute to the causes that the insurgents can use to get support and recruits. 
The host-nation government’s ability and willingness to reform is crucial to the 
success of counterinsurgency operations (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 2). Political 
strategies for defeating an insurgency rely on the host-nation government being able to 
reestablish its control in contested areas and to reform (Kilcullen, Porter, and Burgos 2). 
If a government is corrupt and violates its own constitution and laws it will seriously 
undermine any counterinsurgency operations (Thompson 66). 
This idea was incorporated into Sir Robert Thompson’s second principle of 
counterinsurgency. In this principle, Thompson stated that the host-nation government 
must obey the law and not enact any laws that can be determined to be discriminatory 
(52). He also advocated for publically prosecuting government officials who violate the 
law as well as insurgents (Thompson 53). These trials serve the purpose of demonstrating 
to the populace the government’s level of commitment and the efficacy of government 
institutions. 
The importance of the effective support of the host-nation government was also 
deemed to be of the utmost importance by the U.S. Marine Corps in the 1940 Small Wars 
Manual. In the manual, the authors recommended that the marines assume control of 
government agencies in the event that the initial arrival of the marines did not improve 
the situation (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter I: Introduction” 6). The Small Wars 
Manual went as far as to recommend the establishment of military government and then 
transitioning that government back to the native population as their agencies become 
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capable of handling their duties (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter I: Introduction” 6). 
The manual also advocated advising civil authorities of their duties and informing the 
populace of the responsibilities of the civil authorities (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter 
I: Introduction” 7). 
Like Thompson, the Small Wars Manual advocated using civil institutions to 
punish officials who break the law or are corrupt (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter XII: 
Armed Native Organizations” 23). In a chapter written about the organization and arming 
of a constabulary, the authors advocated letting the leadership of the constabulary 
investigate alleged crimes of its members. It also instructed Marines to let the 
constabulary punish those convicted of a crime after the Chief Executive approved the 
conviction (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter XII: Armed Native Organizations” 23). 
This approach was intended to show the populace that the institutions of government are 
also subject to the laws of the land (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter XII: Armed Native 
Organizations” 24). 
The insurgency in Cuba that began in 1956 is an excellent example of how 
corrupt and ineffective host-nation governments and their institutions can cede victory to 
an insurgent organization. Batista, who had been in control of Cuba since 1934, was 
going to lose the Cuban presidential election in 1952 (Paul et al., Paths to Victory: 
Detailed Insurgency Case Studies 104). Batista then conducted a coup to remain in 
power. His corruption and repression pushed most segments of the population away from 
supporting his government and dealt a significant blow to his government’s legitimacy 
(Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies 104). In 1958, President 
Eisenhower stopped the shipment of arms to the Batista regime and the U.S. State 
Department decided to not recognize Batista as the legitimate ruler of Cuba (Paul et al., 
Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies 108). 
The decision to cut off Batista was reached after the failure of a major military 
operation that the Cuban military executed against Castro in the Sierra Maestra (Paul et 
al., Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies 108). This failed operation was 
effectively the last straw for the U.S. government. The United States had been 
considering stopping any support for Batista as a result of his lack of legitimacy with the 
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people of Cuba (Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies 107). It 
also became apparent that the military could not win against the insurgents. The military 
was disillusioned by the corruption in their top-ranking officers and in the lack of 
training. This led to high numbers of defections from the military to the insurgents (Paul 
et al., Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies 107). 
Support for Batista was withdrawn in December 1958 and Batista fled Cuba in 
January 1959 (Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies 109). Less 
than a month had passed between the withdrawal of support and the collapse of the 
Batista regime indicating its extreme lack of legitimacy with the population (Paul et al., 
Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies 110). Batista’s military was 
inefficient and began to defect as a result of corruption and inadequate training (Paul et 
al., Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies 107). Batista’s corruption and 
repressive tactics drove the population to support the insurgency.   
Gordon McCormick, Steven Horton, and Lauren Harrison noted that the defection 
of the military is often the first sign of host-nation government collapse during 
insurgencies (335). They also noted that the regime’s staunchest supporters might begin 
to send family and money overseas in preparation for the inevitable collapse of the 
regime (McCormick, Horton, and Harrison 335). A requirement addressing the defection 
of the military or the movement of influential families and their assets out of the conflict 
region would be helpful in answering this PIR.   
The defection of the military due to increased corruption of government 
institutions was also evident in the events of the Arab Spring in 2011. In Egypt, the 
military became ever more unhappy with the corruption of the Mubarak regime and 
especially when it became apparent that Gamal Mubarak was going to follow his father 
into control of Egypt. Gamal was a businessman and the military believed he was going 
to support businessmen at the expense of the military. This led the military to decide not 
to intercede on behalf of Mubarak during the Arab Spring (Goldstone 8–16). 
Corruption also led to the loss of legitimacy of the Tunisian regime and caused its 
military to defect as well. Zine Abidine Ben Ali turned a blind eye to his wife’s and her 
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family’s corruption. His wife and her family took money and mansions from 
businessmen in return for favors from the government. When the protests erupted in 
Tunisia, the military decided not to intervene to keep Ben Ali’s family in power 
(Goldstone 8–16). 
These cases show that corruption can weaken the effectiveness of 
counterinsurgency operations and the legitimacy of supported governments. The last two 
cases show that corruption can significantly degrade the legitimacy of the supported 
government leading it to collapse. The Cuban case also showed that outside support for a 
government that is seen as illegitimate can only stall the fall of that government, not 
defeat an insurgency (Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies 
110). Significant reforms still have to be made to ensure victory. 
The corrupt or illegal actions of the government provides the insurgency with 
additional grievances and causes to use to gain support and recruits as well as evidence to 
use in the media to delegitimize the host-nation government. This leads to the third 
recommended PIR. It is important to understand how the insurgency is manipulating 
popular support for the government. 
C. PIR #3: HOW IS THE INSURGENCY MANIPULATING THE 
POPULATION TO DEGRADE SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT? 
If acts of revolutionary violence are quixotic or inappropriate, they will 
not be tolerated by other members of the system, and instead of 
terminating the system they will be dealt with as forms of crime or lunacy. 
Acts of revolt “differ from simple crimes to the extent that collective 
support given the outlaws is not itself the result of coercion.”  Therefore, 
when revolutionaries promote and other members of the system accept the 
return of war, the society itself must have become worse than war; and the 
desire for a better society, even at the expense of a temporary return to 
war, must have become widespread. (Johnson 12) 
If insurgencies are considered to be criminal if the social system is not thought to 
be broken, then it is necessary to determine how the insurgency is manipulating public 
opinion to convince them that a government or society needs to change or is broken. 
Removing the causes of this belief will help to reduce the number of recruits for the 
insurgency and will help to solidify the end of the conflict. 
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Chalmers Johnson wrote in his book, Revolutionary Change, that the best 
counterinsurgency or counter guerrilla strategy consists of social change and security of 
the population (150). He thought that revolutionary war only comes about as a result of 
an elites’ unwillingness to change. Guerrilla warfare ensues as a result of this political 
failure of the elites to accept that change in the social system is required (Johnson 150). 
The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual comes to a similar conclusion. It states 
that the causes of insurgencies are not military in nature and are the result of economic, 
social, or political issues that were allowed to fester and were not addressed when the 
government had the ability to address them (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, “Chapter I: 
Introduction” 15). Emergencies then arise as a result of the issues coming to head and no 
longer allowing for a peaceful adjustment to the situation (U.S. Dept. of the Navy, 
“Chapter I: Introduction” 16). Solving these problems then requires the balanced 
application of force and addressing the social causes of the unrest (U.S. Dept. of the 
Navy, “Chapter I: Introduction” 16). 
It is therefore very important to identify the changes that a society or government 
needs to make to maintain legitimacy and control of their territory and population. 
Conflicts of extended duration usually require a cause as shown in the previous chapter. 
These causes are manipulated by the insurgency to change public opinion and support for 
the government. Paul Cornish states that insurgencies quickly realize that they can gain a 
distinct advantage in the domain of ideas to compensate for their physical weakness (77). 
He goes on to say that effective insurgencies can sum up their causes in single lines of 
text keying on causes of liberation, countering repression, throwing out occupiers, etc. 
(Cornish 77). The government and the counterinsurgent have an inherently much harder 
job of trying to counter these ideas and it is nearly impossible to do that with concise 
statements like the ones the insurgency benefits from (Cornish 77). Understanding what 
the insurgents claim to be fighting for can help to identify themes or messages that the 
supported government or counterinsurgent force may need to disseminate.  
Open Source Intelligence is an excellent way of determining how the insurgency 
is attempting to manipulate the population’s support for the government or 
counterinsurgency operations. It also would be a great way of identifying the narrative 
 43
the insurgency is using to gain popular support or to delegitimize the supported 
government. The 10th Mountain Division determined OSINT was an important 
component of its intelligence operations in Afghanistan in 2005. It created a cell within 
its intelligence section whose sole purpose was the analysis of OSINT and how public 
opinion was being swayed through news media for or against the government of 
Afghanistan (Levesque 55–57). The intelligence this cell produced was used to support 
the Division Public Affairs Officer and Information Operations. It helped to determine 
the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency strategies being employed through what they 
termed Information Operations Battle Damage Assessment (Levesque 55–57). 
In the end, effective counterinsurgency operations require intelligence support. 
That intelligence support needs to focus on illuminating the insurgency’s support 
structure so that military and diplomatic means can be leveraged to decrease the flow of 
money, men, equipment, and supplies to the insurgency. It also must focus on identifying 
personnel and agencies within the government that are working at cross-purposes with 
the counterinsurgency strategy to keep hypocrisy from being a cause adopted by the 
insurgency and to ensure the populace perceives the government as legitimate. Finally, 
the intelligence community needs to identify the way in which the insurgency is 
manipulating the population’s support for the government. If this problem is addressed it 
may help to cut internal support for the insurgency and address the root causes for the 
crisis. The next part of the problem is how to get the answers to these problems from the 
units in the conflict area to policy makers. That problem will be addressed through the 
use of written intelligence assessments, as discussed in the next chapter. 
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IV. COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT 
A. HOW DOES THE MILITARY GET THE ANSWERS TO THE PIRS 
FROM THE COLLECTOR TO THE POLICYMAKERS? 
Once intelligence has been collected answering priority intelligence requirements, 
how is that information formatted and disseminated to the policymakers who need it?  
MG Flynn wrote that he believed the answer was in written assessments (Flynn, 
Pottinger, and Batchelor 23). He stated that not much information is shared through the 
use of PowerPoint slides with short bullet comments or color-coded spreadsheets. The 
key is a comprehensive written assessment that military commanders take the time to 
review carefully before it is published (Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 23). 
If a written assessment is the answer, then what is the format for such an 
assessment?  The FM 3–24’s chapter on intelligence recommends writing assessments 
focused on comprehensive insurgency analysis (U.S. Dept. of the Army, FM 3–
24/MCWP 3–33.5: Counterinsurgency 3–31). According to the FM 3–24, comprehensive 
insurgency analysis is comprised of nine tasks for analysts to accomplish in order to help 
commanders understand the nature of the insurgency they face (U.S. Dept. of the Army, 
FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5: Counterinsurgency 3–32). Analysts must work to identify 
insurgent goals; insurgent motivations; popular grievances insurgents use to their 
advantage; how culture impacts the insurgency and counterinsurgency; how social 
networks impact the insurgency; how social networks interact with one another; insurgent 
organizations; insurgent leadership; popular perception of the supported government, the 
insurgency, and counterinsurgent forces (U.S. Dept. of the Army, FM 3–24/MCWP 3–
33.5: Counterinsurgency 3–32). 
Not all of these aspects covered under comprehensive insurgency analysis will 
apply equally to different insurgencies or to the same insurgency in different places or 
times. This is due to the fact that all insurgencies are local in nature (U.S. Dept. of the 
Army, FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5: Counterinsurgency 3–1). Additionally, intelligence in 
counterinsurgency is a bottom-up enterprise. In other words, the units who are directly in 
touch with the people are the ones that collect the most intelligence useful in determining 
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counterinsurgency policy and operations (U.S. Dept. of the Army, FM 3–24/MCWP 3–
33.5: Counterinsurgency 3–1). They are also the units with the smallest intelligence 
sections. This is a fact not missed by MG Flynn. In his paper, he addresses the issue by 
recommending the staffing of Stability Operations Information Centers and states that 
analysts have much more of an effect the closer to the problem they are (Flynn, Pottinger, 
and Batchelor 22). 
With this lack of personnel, an efficient and comprehensive method of writing 
intelligence assessments must be used to address what information is essential to the 
consumers of this intelligence. It is also imperative to not overburden the limited 
manpower and resources of the small intelligence shops that would be producing such 
intelligence assessments. So, what would an efficient method of writing an intelligence 
assessment look like?  Robert Jervis provides an excellent proposal that can serve as the 
basis for just such a situation. 
B. WRITTEN COUNTERINSURGENCY ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND 
FORMAT DEVELOPED FROM INTELLIGENCE FAILURE 
Robert Jervis was appointed to conduct a postmortem of the intelligence failures 
in the CIA leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. In his investigation, Jervis was 
instructed to not focus on the quality of the information the analysts received, but to focus 
on the quality of the analytical work done (17). This focus means that he spent little time 
investigating problems with collection and more time looking at the process of analyzing 
the information that was collected. This serves the purposes of this chapter perfectly. 
Jervis’ investigation into the intelligence failures leading up to the Iranian 
Revolution has lessons that can be used to provide proper intelligence support to 
counterinsurgency operations. The timeframe the investigation encompassed was from 
the middle of 1977 until the end of 1978. Those two dates were chosen because minor 
protests against the Shah began at the beginning of this timeframe, and the U.S. 
government finally paid attention to the situation in Iran at the end of 1978 (Jervis 16). 
Before getting into his assessment of the analysis conducted by the CIA leading 
up to the revolution, Jervis made a couple of comments that allude to intelligence 
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requirements not being properly levied. He stated that the U.S. government was unaware 
of the goals and grievances of the multitude of opposition groups (Jervis 17–18). It is 
apparent that no requirement was developed to answer this important question, which 
happens to be the third recommended priority intelligence requirement from the previous 
chapter addressing how the insurgency is manipulating the populace to degrade support 
for the government. This would have been helpful to understand the driving force behind 
the protests.   No such requirement existed, for as Jervis pointed out, no U.S. government 
agency complained about any of the restrictions keeping them from getting this 
information (18). In the case of the religious opposition, it would have been as simple as 
going to the local bazaar to get a tape of one of Khomeini’s sermons (Jervis 18). 
Jervis found in his investigation that the CIA had only four analysts devoted to 
Iran despite the progressively deteriorating situation in Iran at that time (21). Another 
issue he found was that the intelligence community did not question policy advocated by 
the State Department or other agencies of government (Jervis 19). Jervis states that, 
“analysts are not permitted to comment on American policy. This is understandable since 
decision makers do not want kibitzing, but it can be a major defect when the other side’s 
behavior is strongly influenced by what the United States is doing” (Jervis 19–20). Jervis 
stated that this aversion to commenting on policy was so ingrained in the analysts that 
when he mentioned to the analysts that they did not comment on policy matters, most of 
them had not realized it (20). Jervis did not go into depth on this topic because he 
believed that his postmortem would be used to further attack the Carter administration. 
Based on this belief, he deleted a significant portion of the report that covered this topic 
(Jervis 20). 
This was an interesting finding because according to Richard Betts, policymakers 
expect intelligence not just to warn or inform them, but also to recommend what decision 
needs to be made or policy needs to be implemented (27). Betts also believes that for 
intelligence to be useful it must convince the customers that taking the time to read it is 
worthwhile (15). That is not always the case, as Jervis stated in his postmortem. 
Policymakers have a significant number of items to read in a given day and if the 
intelligence product does not deal with a decision that needed to be made immediately, it 
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did not get much attention (Jervis 22). Jervis assumed that since policymakers were not 
reading the assessments on Iran, other intelligence professionals were reading these 
assessments and questioning them. This was not the case (Jervis 22). 
Jervis went into further detail in his postmortem. He found that analysts with 
expertise on Iran did not collaborate on their assessments. When they did hold meetings, 
the meetings were driven by personal initiative and not by institutional requirements or 
norms (Jervis 22). Additionally, economic analysts wrote a significant number of 
assessments on the economic crisis in Iran and political analysts wrote a large volume of 
material on the political crisis. Neither group coordinated with each other to see how the 
economic situation was impacting politics and vice versa (Jervis 22). 
To avoid these problems, intelligence analysts dealing with an insurgency should 
write an assessment that begins with a detailed policy recommendation. This 
recommendation should focus on policy changes that would positively impact the 
counterinsurgency operations in their area. Any successful policy would deal with cutting 
off tangible support for the insurgency, addressing host nation political support for 
counterinsurgency operations, and address the core causes of the insurgency in the area of 
operations for that specific unit. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the policies 
advocated should not focus solely on military operations but also encompass social and 
political changes. General McChrystal understood this while he was in command in 
Afghanistan. He believed that the insurgency would be defeated by winning over the 
population, not by killing the enemy (Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 24). 
Ground units that have day-to-day contact with the population are better suited to 
compose these assessments because they should have a better understanding of the 
cultural considerations that impact policy decisions that have been made or are going to 
be made. Relying on academics to understand culture has its problems. For academic 
models to fit, they have to make some generalization such as assuming there is an 
“average Middle Eastern male” (Salmoni and Holmes-Eber 21). It can lead to 
overgeneralizations about the populace (Salmoni and Holmes-Eber 21). These 
overgeneralizations lead to faulty policy decisions or policy decisions that may affect one 
particular group or region and not others. The impacts of culture on a policy proposed by 
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analysts will differ; cultural considerations are often not consistent throughout a society 
(Salmoni and Holmes-Eber 21). Allowing analysts the freedom to propose policy will 
help to ensure that the local culture is taken into account. 
Training analysts to use structured analytic techniques will also help to address 
issues with unsupported assessments and recommendation. These techniques should be 
used in the development of their assessments and policy recommendations. Richards 
Heuer Jr. and Randolph Pherson think that using such techniques ensures “that the 
reasoning behind the conclusions is more transparent and readily accepted,” and it also 
enhances “the collection and interpretation of evidence” (7). Not only are they 
recommended, but the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 required that the Director of 
National Intelligence apply these techniques as required throughout the intelligence 
enterprise (Heuer and Pherson 9). 
Structured analytic techniques were designed to assist the analyst in making his or 
her reasoning behind an assessment easily identified by other analysts to ensure that it 
can be reviewed and properly discussed. These techniques help to ensure that dissenting 
opinions are also considered in the analytical process, not after the assessment is written 
or in the postmortem of an intelligence failure (Heuer and Pherson 22). 
Four such techniques proposed by Heuer and Pherson have particular importance 
to assessments written in support of counterinsurgency operations. The first is using what 
they call a “cross-impact matrix” (Heuer and Pherson 31). The cross-impact matrix 
consists of identifying a list of variables and players that impact a situation and talking 
through how these different players and variables impact each other (Heuer and Pherson 
104). Heuer and Pherson state that this technique is great for understanding complex 
situations and accounting for a large number of variables (104). 
This description of the operational environment definitely applies to 
counterinsurgency operations and any intelligence focusing on a weak state. Joel Migdal 
points out the different influences that states have to balance in order to maintain power 
or implement change. He thinks that states struggle with other internal organizations over 
who has the right to implement rules governing different behaviors (Migdal 64). These 
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organizations can be tribes as in the case of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party’s attempt to reduce the 
power of the tribes when the Ba’ath Party came to power (Baram 1–31). The contest is 
between the state and such institutions of society as tribes, religious institutions, and 
industry (Migdal 64). A leader uses the state to implement rules and this brings the state 
into conflict with organizations that believe they should be dictating those specific rules 
(Migdal 65). In other words, for every action or reform the government makes, there is an 
organization that is attempting to maintain its authority in confrontation with the state. In 
cases where the government was weak and lacked the ability to mandate its policy, 
Migdal identified that it seldom gave up its attempts to implement change. It also did not 
continue to battle the opposing social institutions. The government reached a sort of 
détente with the social forces that opposed it out of necessity (Migdal 65). Robert Jervis 
would agree; he states, “It is Political Science 101 that reform from above is very difficult 
and often leads to disintegration…” (19). 
The situation that Migdal discusses of a weak state attempting some sort of 
change can be characteristic of counterinsurgency. Identifying the groups and institutions 
that will either support or oppose any policy will help the analyst fill out the cross-impact 
matrix and further understand the effects of implementing any proposed policy. It will 
also help in gaining a much better understanding of the situation. 
Analysts could also use what Heuer and Pherson call a “Key Assumptions Check” 
(31). This technique is best used when information is incomplete and analysts are forced 
to make assumptions about “how things normally work in a country of interest” (Heuer 
and Pherson 183). Identifying the assumptions assists in the use of the cross-impact 
matrix also by helping the analyst to consider different interactions between variables 
(Heuer and Pherson 184). Reviewing multiple times the assumptions that an assessment 
is based on ensures that the assumptions are still relevant. This should be a continuous 
process even after the assessment is published. An event that disproves an assumption 
may dictate the need to rethink the assessment.   
The analysts involved in the intelligence failure prior to the Iranian Revolution 
may have benefitted from this process. Robert Jervis found in his investigation that the 
analysts constantly assumed that if demonstrations broke out again, the Shah would 
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respond by cracking down, even though the advice the United States was giving the Shah 
was to “continue liberalizing” (Jervis 19). A reassessment of the key assumption that the 
Shah would crack down, taking into account pressure on the Shah to liberalize may have 
led to the consideration of the possibility that he eventually would not crack down. This 
would have caused analysts and policymakers to consider what would happen if the Shah 
decided not to crack down. 
The fact that this was not considered also demonstrates that it is important to 
evaluate assessments after they are published. Once the assessment is published, it is 
important to determine the accuracy of the assessment. One way this done is through the 
use of the “Indicators” technique (Heuer and Pherson 132). 
This technique is tough to implement because it requires the identification of 
measurable or identifiable events that point to specific action taking place in the future. 
(Heuer and Pherson 132). These indicators help analysts to see change occurring even 
when it is occurring at a slow pace, as it often does. The indicators help the analysts focus 
and identify changes so that they do not catch people by surprise (Heuer and Pherson 
133). Sir Robert Thompson stated that counterinsurgency is a slow methodical process 
and that the news media latches onto the “magnetic attraction in large-scale helicopter 
operations” or other events but the “constructive and beneficial measures are the main 
features of the campaign and foreign aid” (101–102). Much like the media that 
Thompson describes, an analyst can become distracted with the explosion of IEDs or 
other events. Identifying indicators helps them focus on the events that may not be as 
attention grabbing as massive operations or attacks. 
A technique the helps ensure the analyst has considered all possible options is the 
“Analysis of Competing Hypothesis” (Heuer and Pherson 32). This technique requires 
the analyst or group of analysts to develop all the possible hypotheses they can come up 
with and use the evidence they have collected to support or refute each hypothesis (Heuer 
and Pherson 32). The technique helps to defeat deception by identifying the hypothesis 
that has the least evidence supporting it, instead of the most evidence  (Heuer and 
Pherson 32). A way of using this in counterinsurgency could be to take another unit’s 
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assessment or proposed policy and use the evidence that has been collected to prove or 
refute each assessment. 
An individual analyst can use all of these structured analytic techniques if an 
intelligence section is undermanned. They work best when used by a group of analysts 
(Heuer and Pherson 221). In a time of globalization with video teleconferences, secure 
phones, and secure Internet chat it is not required that analysts be sitting next to each 
other to employ these techniques. They can do it from right in front of their workstation.  
In the end, a well-written assessment with reasoning that is transparent and 
provides policymakers with a recommendation of what to do will be extremely useful. 
Adding supporting information about who will oppose the policy and might support it 
also provides ideas for things that can be done to support a proposed policy. Additionally, 
as the assessment works its way through each echelon, it will have more and more 
attention brought to it as analysts work to refute or bolster the argument made. It will also 
foster communication between organizations that disagree over recommendations. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis looked into the implementation of doctrine to help at least partially 
solve the problems experienced with the military providing intelligence support to 
counterinsurgency operations. It did not identify any solutions to the manning issues 
currently experienced in the military intelligence force structure.   MG Flynn and the FM 
3–24 both mention this issue in passing, but do not make substantive recommendations 
on addressing this issue. Intelligence in counterinsurgency is a bottom-up driven process, 
but the manning of intelligence organizations concentrates the fewest people the nearest 
to the bottom.   Further research into how to bring the intelligence manning into 
proportion with the requirements is warranted. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis focused on the problem of the military’s contribution to intelligence 
collection and production in counterinsurgency. The military’s intelligence problem was 
identified as PIR not being properly developed to support effective counterinsurgency 
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operations. Some of the problem was a lack of intelligence requirements levied from the 
policymaker level to support counterinsurgency operations. This was only part of the 
problem because the military should not wait for intelligence guidance. Military doctrine 
and the use of the mission analysis process provides the intelligence requirements needed 
to support whatever operations the military is required to conduct. 
Joint and service specific doctrine was reviewed along with other literature on 
counterinsurgency operations to determine what was considered to be necessary to 
conduct effective counterinsurgency operations. Then a review of two studies conducted 
by the RAND Corporation was conducted to determine what dictates a successfully 
employed counterinsurgency campaign. In that review, it was determined that 
counterinsurgency forces that interdicted tangible support for the insurgency were 
successful. Additionally, it was determined that counterinsurgency efforts were effective 
if the counterinsurgent force and the host nation government both effectively 
implemented policies aimed at defeating the insurgency. 
Finally, an assessment was recommended that begins with a policy 
recommendation and uses structured analytic techniques. The structured analytic 
techniques help to ensure the completeness of the assessment and the transparency of the 
reasons behind the assessment. The use of these techniques helps to ensure that these 
assessments can be adequately reviewed and debated as they move from the ground unit 
to the policymakers. 
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